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To say that the familial and cultural ties that bound Chinese society were severed or weakened 
and that “patriotism transcended regionalism, localism, and familism” during the Resistance War, 
as Diana Lary claims in The Chinese People at War, is too general. Nationalism and patriotism 
might have been priorities for urban intellectuals and elites, but such priorities were not 
necessarily shared by everyone. People at the rural grassroots in southern Guangdong did not 
share them. This thesis argues that Siyi villagers’ survival tactics against security threats between 
1937 and 1949 were borne out of self-preservation and localism, not nationalism. Based on oral 
interviews conducted in Hong Kong, Vancouver, and Burnaby of seniors who lived in Taishan or 
Kaiping villages between 1932 and 1949, this project examines the villagers’ survival tactics and 
motives when faced with changing security threats during the prewar, wartime, and postwar 
periods. Village feuds, bandits, the Japanese armed forces, food scarcity, and traditional gender 
roles were the most dangerous threats facing villagers. The villagers’ survival tactics reveal a 
pattern of independence from state institutions while relying on local and familial connections. 
Nationalism and patriotism did not impact Taishan and Kaiping villagers as much as localism did.  
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Introduction 
 In 1942, Mrs. Wong convinced her husband that it was better to sell their seven-year-old 
son instead of their nine-year-old daughter, Wong LS. The couple lived in Changsa village, 
Kaiping, with their three sons and a daughter. The family became destitute after Mr. Wong 
gambled away the family’s fortune: a tofu skin factory, two cows, and land. Mr. Wong’s health 
declined and without any means of providing for the family, the parents planned to sell one of 
their children. Mr. Wong received an offer of nine tam (擔)1 of grain for Wong LS as a servant 
girl to a family in the adjacent county of Enping. However, Mrs. Wong argued that sold girls 
would have harder lives as servants whereas sold boys would have easier lives and could fetch 
more.2 The tradition of the son carrying on the family name assigned a higher value to boys. 
Wealthy rural families without sons commonly bought boys in this tradition. Wong LS’s parents 
sold her seven-year-old younger brother to a distant village for forty daiyang (大洋) or Minguo 
silver dollars.3 Forty daiyang could buy the family forty tam of grain which was over four times 
what Wong LS could fetch.  
 The Wongs’ story showed that at the height of the Resistance War against Japan between 
1937 and 1945, struggling to overcome destitution and survive starvation were common 
priorities for poor families in the Siyi villages. When it came to survival, grassroots families 
considered many factors. Patriotism was not one of them. Grassroots wartime experiences like 
the Wongs’ differed from those of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) produced gazetteers and 
wenshi ziliao that focused on villagers’ heroic efforts in resisting Japanese invaders for the love 
of their country. For example, the Taishan gazetteer produced by a CCP-affiliated research office 
in 1995 has a dedicated section on village braves’ valiant resistance that resulted in death and 
injuries to Japanese troops.4 The gazetteer recorded instances of citizens killed and maimed by 
 
1 1 tam = 1331⁄3 lb. 
2 Interview. Wong LS, August 9, 2019, March 15, 2020. 
3 1 Minguo silver dollar bought 1 tam of grain at the end of the Republican era. Purchasing power of a 
daiyang in the 1940s. 
4 Huang Jianyun and Li Xianhua, eds., 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer) (Taishan shi: Guangdong renmin 
chubanshe, 1995), 223. 
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Japanese armed forces, but did not mention how the villagers survived the Resistance War years. 
Between the extremes of resisting and being killed or maimed by Japanese troops, how did the 
villagers survive wartime?  
 Historian Diana Lary surveys the social sufferings of a wide range of Chinese people from 
different social economic classes and various regions during the war. Lary argues that the 
familial and cultural ties that bound Chinese society were severed or weakened and that 
“patriotism transcended regionalism, localism, and familism”5 during the war. This is too general 
and does not necessarily apply to the Taishan and Kaiping counties of southern Guangdong. 
Taishan and Kaiping interviewees’ stories revealed consistently strong localism and familial ties 
before, during, and after the war. 
 Priorities for urban elites differ from those of people at the rural grassroots. Patriotism and 
nationalism were prevalent among urban intellectuals since the turn of the twentieth century and 
were especially heightened during the Resistance War. Patriotism was a priority among wartime 
urban elites as discussed in work by such scholars as Frederic Wakeman,6 Poshek Fu, and 
Timothy Brook.7 Fu examines wartime literature to show how urban writers and intellectuals 
faced the moral dilemma of choosing between family survival and patriotism in occupied 
Shanghai.8 All the intellectuals claimed to be patriotic, yet some chose passivity, resistance, or 
collaboration. All had justifications for their choices. Urban elites’ nationalism was not 
necessarily shared by other social economic groups. Urban elites might have struggled between 
patriotism and survival, and went to great lengths to justify their choices; however, patriotism 
and nationalism were not priorities for lower-class women surviving wartime Beijing, as 
demonstrated in Zhao Ma’s research.9 
 
5 Diana Lary, The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937–1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38. 
6 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
7 Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
8 Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–
1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
9 Zhao Ma, Runaway Wives, Urban Crimes, and Survival Tactics in Wartime Beijing, 1937–1949 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015). 
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 Zhao Ma uses court documents to construct how lower-class urban women survived 
economic insecurity in wartime Beijing. Although destitute, these women resourcefully used  
their community connections and a wide variety of means, including bigamy and adultery, to 
navigate an environment hostile to their gender and class. Their survival tactics trumped 
traditional morals and legal constraints. Patriotism was not a factor for these destitute women. 
Likewise, people at the rural grassroots in southern Guangdong might not have considered 
patriotism when surviving security threats. Unlike Ma’s narrow examination on a singular group 
and one security threat, I look at the bigger picture of how different social economic and gender 
groups survived different security threats in rural Southern Guangdong. 
 Timothy Brook focuses on wartime local elites’ collaboration and resistance in the lower 
Yangtze Valley, Shanghai, and Nanjing. He rejects the postwar nationalistic framework of 
distinct moralistic binary categories of wartime collaborators and resisters, but instead urges 
historians to examine people’s wartime actions based on their motives and the actions’ resulting 
consequences.10 This is a good point. Brook’s work inspires me to examine rural Siyi grassroots 
residents’ survival tactics against security threats to determine their motivations. To better learn 
what motivated them, I look beyond the wartime to include prewar and postwar periods to 
compare continuities and changes in their coping strategies.  
 Different scholars have different approaches to study how urban women, military elites, 
and urban intellectuals survived the Resistance War; however, very little work has been done on 
ordinary people in rural areas. This dearth is especially true when it comes to southern China. 
Urban elites’ grappling with nationalism is a common theme in wartime research, but 
nationalism was not necessarily embraced by everyone or always embraced for patriotic reasons. 
Glen Peterson demonstrated how overseas Chinese merchants adopted a nationalist discourse to 
pursue business interest in their native villages at the turn of the twentieth century.11 Sherman 
Cochran documented one elite family’s survival strategy in post-1949 Shanghai. Their outward 
 
10 Timothy Brook, Collaboration. 
11 Glen Peterson, “Overseas Chinese and Merchant Philanthropy in China: From Culturalism to 
Nationalism,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 1 (May 2005): 104. 
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embrace of nationalism and patriotism towards the CCP’s China seemed calculated, conflicted, 
and sometimes forced.12  
 I argue that Siyi villagers’ survival tactics against security threats between 1937 and 1949 
were borne out of self-preservation and localism, not nationalism. Siyi protective strategies were 
similar to Huaibei peasants in Elizabeth Perry’s research. Perry argued that collective violence 
such as banditry and rebellions in North China’s Huaibei from 1845 to 1945 were direct survival 
responses to local ecological and societal features rather than a purposeful direct challenge to the 
state authority.13 Siyi local ties were strong. Even overseas men who worked far away from their 
home villages would be considered locals. Historians who specialize in overseas Chinese such as 
Philip Kuhn, Madeline Hsu, and Glen Peterson demonstrated the strong connections and impact 
overseas men had on their home communities even though they were far away.14 Hsu highlighted 
how through Gold Mountain firms (金山莊) and overseas Chinese magazines (僑刊), Taishanese 
Americans maintained financial and emotional ties with families left behind despite decades of 
separation.15 To support my argument, I compare the consistency and changes of security threats 
as well as villagers’ survival tactics before, during, and after the Resistance War to determine 
villagers’ motivation. I examine the characteristics of Siyi villages and security threats that 
affected villagers the most. 
 My argument relies mainly on the primary sources of oral history interviews, Taishan and 
Kaiping gazetteers, as well as wenshi ziliao (文史资料). Wenshi ziliao contain detailed local oral 
historical records; however, they were collected by government officials with party agendas. 
Information was edited to suit CCP political narratives at the time of publication. All wartime 
stories I came across have strong nationalistic narratives, showing anti-KMT (Kuomintang) 
 
12 Sherman Cochran, “Capitalists Choosing Communist China: The Liu Family of Shanghai, 1948–56,” in 
Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. 
Pickowicz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 359. 
13 Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1980). 
14 Philip A. Kuhn, “Why China Historians Should Study the Chinese Diaspora, and Vice-Versa,” Journal 
of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 2 (November 2006). Glen Peterson, “House Divided: Transnational Families 
in the Early Years of the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Studies Review 31 (March 2007). 
15 Madeline Yuan-yin Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration 
Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 34, 
124. 
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sentiments and county citizens’ vigorous resistance against the Japanese army.16 For example, a 
sentence like “KMT’s failure in fighting the Japanese led to the county citizens’ heroic resistance 
and sacrifices to protect our homes and country” appears in almost every wartime story 
published in the first five issues of Kaiping wenshi. Surely, some people did not resist. What 
were their survival tactics and motives? The CCP’s nationalistic narratives do not reflect rural 
grassroots reality. Although official records do not reveal the whole truth, they provide good 
starting points for further investigation of historical events.  
I interviewed sixteen seniors in Hong Kong, Vancouver, and Burnaby who lived in 
Taishan or Kaiping villages between 1932 and 1949. My interviewees came from a variety of 
backgrounds. Differences in gender, age, and family wealth levels yielded different stories. 
Perhaps due to gender roles and sensibilities, the grandmothers’ stories revealed detailed 
dynamics inside the households, while the grandfathers’ stories were about events outside the 
households.17 These seniors’ ages ranged from their seventies to eighties. They were children or 
young adults between 1937 to 1949, so they did not make active decisions in surviving their 
environment, their parents did. The interviewees were witnesses and passive receivers of their 
parents’ decisions. We can get a sense of their memory and perception of security threats and 
their environment during that time. My interviewees’ family wealth ranged from well off 
families who never experienced hunger, to poor families who sold their children to survive. 
Wealthy and poor families faced different security threats and deployed different survival tactics. 
I examine villagers’ survival tactics against different threats at a village and household level. 
Villagers’ tactics did not always guarantee safety for all family members. Not every family 
member survived unscathed. For example, the Wong family’s destitution was temporarily 
alleviated at a cost, selling the youngest son. At times, longstanding family strategies such as 
receiving regular overseas remittances could imperil the villagers. For example, the villagers 
 
16 Peng Qiupin, 开平民众抗日武装活跃在江会前 (Kaiping civilian anti-Japanese armed forces active on 
the frontline of Jianghui) Kaiping wenshi 1 (December 1981): 4; Seto Lim and Tse Junbi, “七士守南楼, 
英勇抗日寇” (Seven martyrs guarding the southern tower, bravely resisting the Japanese invaders), 
Kaiping wenshi 2 (August 1982): 46; Peng Qiupin, 从三失台城到三失苍城始末 (From losing Taicheng 
thrice to losing Cangcheng thrice) Kaiping wenshi 2 (August 1982): 54; Guan Wenzhou, 奋起抗日保卫
家乡–记魁冈之战 (Rise up to resist Japan and defend the hometown – battle of Kuigang) Kaiping 
wenshi 3 (December 1982): 84. 
17 Grandmothers were vocally expressive and easily shared many detailed stories while grandfathers 
required more prompts to talk about their experiences. 
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became reliant on remittances to buy food instead of growing their own, thus reducing their grain 
reserves, which jeopardized them in times of famine. 
 I am aware that my interviewees may have embellished their stories to validate themselves 
like the women in wartime Beijing who concealed, manipulated, overstated, or sensationalized 
their lives when testifying before the judge in Zhao Ma’s work.18 For example, Ng S’s mother 
abandoned her when she was nine years old because of traditional gender roles and folk beliefs. 
Still harbouring bitterness towards her mother, Ng played up her victimhood for sympathy by 
emphasizing her mother’s foolishness and cruelty, which she saw as being caused by 
superstition. When I present Ng’s stories, I make an effort to extract the events from her moral 
judgements and emotional subjectivity. Memories can be fluid and easily reconstructed or may 
be conveyed through constantly changing interpretations. For example, Chow TW commented 
that the cooperation between his village and another village to combat against the Japanese 
invading troops was nationalistic. However, their cooperation at the time might very well have 
been mutual aid for the survival of both villages. Chow TW was educated in postwar China and 
his interpretation of the events might have been influenced by the postwar KMT and CCP’s 
hypernationalistic narratives. Chow’s remembered motivation is reminiscent of Gail Hershatter’s 
study of rural women’s memory of past events, which were shaped, explained and justified by 
current events.19 The KMT and CCP both adopted strong nationalistic postwar narratives in their 
efforts to rebuild and define the country. Dongyoun Hwang shows that the CCP and KMT saw 
the purge and trials of wartime collaborators as a necessary step in building or defining a postwar 
China.20 Resistance is the ultimate demonstration of patriotism and “collaboration is the vilest of 
moral crime” in the postwar nationalistic framework, as Prasenjit Duara puts it.21 Interviewees 
may assume the nationalistic stance because no one wants to appear traitorous to their mother 
country. 
 
18 Ma, Runaway Wives, 31. 
19 Gail Hershatter, The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011). 
20 Dongyoun Hwang, “Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the 
Chinese Collaborators,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no. 1 (2005): 93. See also Leo Ching, Anti-Japan: 
The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019). 
21 Prasenjit Duara, “Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites In Wartime China,” The China 
Journal, no. 59 (January 2008): 142. 
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 Mutual aid societies helped connect me with interviewees, thus accessing their stories.  
Some scholars frame mutual aid organizations as criminal gangs or political secret societies.22 
Sometimes, mutual aid organizations could be the cause of disputes, but I did not come across 
any such stories in the past or present from the organizations I visited or from interviewees. 23 
The mutual aid associations I visited in Vancouver and Hong Kong did not seem to be secret 
societies or criminal enterprises. It was easy for me to connect and access the mutual aid 
associations because my roots were from the same Siyi region as them or have ancestors of the 
same surnames. They treated me as one of their kin. When I asked for help in my research, most 
members were eager to offer assistance.  
 Modest associations attended by seniors were enthusiastic to help and make connections. 
Financially successful associations like the Hong Kong Siyi Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(香港四邑商工總會), established in 1909,24 and Hong Kong Toi Shan Chamber of Commerce 
(香港台山商會), established in 1876, manned by younger employees with no connections in 
surnames or regionality to the associations were less accessible. I attended Hong Kong Kwan 
Clan’s Association’s (香港關氏宗親總會) monthly meeting and witnessed some simple rituals. 
Sharing the same surname as Kwan-kung, he is their patron deity. They had an altar with his 
painting, fruits, flowers, incense, wine, and other offerings. All members recited some short 
respectful words toward the altar before commencing their meeting. The subsequent meeting was 
about mundane organization business regarding group trips back to Kaiping and follow-up of 
status on the previous month’s project. There were two women and about seven men in the 
meeting. Most of them were between their fifties and sixties years old. One was in his nineties 
and one was in her thirties. The members were not threatening at all but quite helpful to me in 
supplying their stories. Although the mutual aid societies’ demonstration of rituals and kin 
 
22 Dian Murray and Qin Baoqi, The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Jean Chesneaux and Lucien Bianco, Popular Movements and 
Secret Societies in China, 1840–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). 
23 温哥華開平會館 (Vancouver Hoi Ping Benevolent Association), 香港開平同鄉會 (Hong Kong 
Kaiping Common Village Association), 香港四邑商工總會 (Hong Kong Siyi Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry), 香港司徒氏宗親會 (Hong Kong Szeto Clan’s Association), 香港關氏宗親總會 (Hong 
Kong Kwan Clan’s Association) 
24 香港四邑商工總會: 一百周年會慶特刊 (Hong Kong Siyi chamber of commerce and industry: 
centennial celebration special issue), 2009, 83. 
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assistance in 2019 could not be used as evidence of their behaviour in the 1930s and 1940s, their 
objective to help their kin and clan seemed consistent since the turn of the twentieth century. As 
a recipient of their goodwill, I am grateful and want to reciprocate. 
 This thesis has six chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background history of Taishan and  
Kaiping’s village characteristics and the counties’ public security situation. The villages’ public 
security environment is important to understand the constraints and deficiencies that shaped 
villagers’ responses to threats. The government did not fully control the countryside, which 
resulted in the villages’ self-reliance. The villages’ characteristics explain the motivations behind 
the villages’ survival tactics against different security threats from 1937 to 1949. Many villages 
were mainly inhabited by wives, the elderly, and young children which determined how they 
responded to security threats. The men worked abroad and sent money back to home villages to 
support their families. Although the men were far away, they had strong connections with their 
home villages and had much influence over home village matters like security issues. 
 Chapters 2 to 6 cover five security threats that were priorities for the counties’ villagers. 
They were village feuds, bandits, the Japanese armed forces, food scarcity, and traditional gender 
roles. Each threat’s changes and continuities are examined from prewar, wartime and postwar. I 
will also discuss the villagers’ survival tactics and their motivations. Village feuds illustrate the 
interconnectivity between villages and local actors, as well as how the villagers dealt with 
violent conflicts. Bandits consistently endangered the villages from before to after the Resistance 
War. We see a pattern of the villagers’ independence from government institutions but 
dependence on overseas kins and clansmen. The villagers’ responses to the Japanese aggression 
contradicted the nationalistic framework of Diana Lary and CCP-affiliated literature. The 
Resistance War exacerbated the desperation of food scarcity when the villagers’ connection to 
their usual provider and protector, overseas kins and clansmen, was disrupted. Traditional gender 
roles were a critical security threat that endangered women and children but did not fit into the 
nationalistic framework. The government had no impact on this issue, but overseas connections 
did. 
 I had intended to illustrate all or parts of my thesis because I want my work to be 
accessible to a broader audience like youths. By presenting my research through illustration, I 
hope to motivate young adults to learn about and explore Chinese history as well as to see its 
 9 
value. I have included an illustrated short story based on this thesis in the Appendix with the 
hope of developing it into a full graphic novel in the near future. 
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Chapter 1. Background  
Taishan and Kaiping Village Characteristics  
 Taishan and Kaiping were two of the four counties called Siyi (四邑), which have many 
overseas villages. See Figure 1 and Figure 2. These two counties’ rural grassroots populations 
ranged from poor landless villagers with no overseas connections to wealthy families supported 
by overseas money who owned land, houses, and businesses in nearby market towns. A large 
population were wealthy and had overseas ties. By 1949, as many as one in five Guangdong 
residents belonged to overseas families.25 Overseas families made up overseas villages. Overseas 
villages’ characteristics were not conducive to resisting Japanese aggression. They consisted of 
mostly wives, the elderly, and young children.  
 
 
Figure 1. Location of Siyi in Guangdong relative to China. 
Map found in https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ 
 
 
25 Shelly Chan, Diaspora’s Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration (Durham, NC: 




Figure 2. Counties in Siyi. 
 
 Overseas villages were formed from their family survival strategy of men making money 
overseas and sending remittances home to support family members. This family strategy 
emerged from the mid-1700s26 to survive wars, famines, and competition for limited resources 
and opportunities.27 By the 1920s, this family strategy was very successful as many family 
members who stayed behind prospered and lived comfortable lives. Before 1928, Taishan 
County received an annual remittance of over US $10 million, which is one-eighth of China’s 
total remittances. By 1930, the amount increased to US $30 million and it was one-third of the 
nation’s total.28 Similarly in Kaiping between 1912 and 1929, overseas men remitted over $33 
 
26 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 135. 
27 Philip A. Kuhn, “Why China Historians Should Study the Chinese Diaspora, and Vice-Versa,” Journal 
of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 2 (November 2006): 166. 
28 Mei Weiqiang and Zhang Guoxiong, 五邑华侨华人史 (Wuyi overseas Chinese history), 365, 349. 
Cited in Chao Longqi, “民国广东四邑侨乡匪患与华侨护乡 (Republican Guangdong Siyi overseas 
village banditry problems and overseas Chinese protection of home villages),” Huaqiao huaren lishi 
yanjiu, no. 1 (March 2013): 2. 
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million (provincial currency) annually to their families.29 Usually, the stay-at-home wives 
converted the remittance into investments in houses, land, and rental property.30 Many overseas 
families did not toil in the fields to grow their food but opted to purchase imported rice. The 
overseas-remittance strategy’s success motivated and pressured more men to leave the counties 
to seek out fortunes abroad. In 1922, the US and Canada had a total of 110,000 overseas 
Chinese, 11,000 of whom came from Kaiping County.31 In 1948, Taishanese living overseas 
reached 93,413.32 Young able-bodied men who remained in the village and not working abroad 
were scoffed at.33  
 Overseas Chinese money was the main force in social and economic construction in Siyi 
hometowns. They ranged from building homes to building bridges and roads, to establishing 
villages and ports, investing in factories, and establishing cultural and educational 
undertakings.34 Additionally, the remittances were vital in alleviating hardships during war, 
famine, and banditry. The villagers relied on their overseas kin and clansmen for protection and 
livelihood even though they were far apart. 
 
Public Security of Taishan and Kaiping 
 In pre-1949 Siyi villages, the public security situation remained consistent since imperial 
times but threats shifted from one form to another. The Qing and Republican central 
governments in Beijing, Nanjing, and Chongqing, or even the provincial government, never fully 
controlled rural Guangdong. Both central administrations lacked the resources to rule over their 
vast domains, relying instead on local gentries to help govern and maintain social order below 
 
29 Liu Zhenggang, “试论侨乡士人的女性观—以民国[开平县志．列女]为例” (Overseas villages’ 
scholarly views of women, based on Republican Kaiping gazetteer, exemplar women scroll),” Wuyi daxue 
xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 14, no. 4 (November 2012): 32. 
30 Peterson, “House Divided,” 26. 
31 Liu, “试论侨乡士人的女性观” (Overseas villages’ scholarly views of women), 32. 
32 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 136. 
33 Interview. Ng S, August 15, 2019. 
34 Chao, “民国广东四邑侨乡匪患与华侨护乡” (Republican Guangdong Siyi overseas village banditry 
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the county level.35 Imperial County officials appointed local gentries, unofficial authorities with 
civil service examination credentials and good community reputations, to run rural self-
government organizations (公局), such as police offices, administration offices, militia, and civil 
corps. 公局 was the public office that administered the covenant (公約) between the state and 
local communities.36  
 After the civil service examination was abolished in 1905, rural ruling leaders’ 
characteristics changed; anyone with ambitions and military capital could assume leadership in 
the rural self-government organizations. Edward McCord explained how lowly peasants who 
salvaged firearms from battlefields and were charismatic enough to attract a following to form 
bandit gangs could negotiate their way to become local warlords.37 These leaders could be 
gentries, merchants, former officials, retired army officers, poor peasants, or even bandits. The 
social and political instability of the Republican period presented opportunities for social 
climbers and armed entrepreneurs from diverse backgrounds.38 Although ruling gentries during 
imperial times were susceptible to corruption, leaders of the 1930s and 1940s were relatively 
more concerned with personal political and economic gains and cared less about the public good. 
As Qiu Jie and Wang Yi’na noted, Republican rural leaders in Guangdong collected land taxes 
from the peasants in the name of the state but pocketed most of it. The elites were ineffective in 
implementing state policies of economic, political, and educational modernization.39 These rural 
leaders disregarded national laws and occasionally conflicted with state armies.40 Nevertheless, 
rural leaders were consistently middlemen between the state and peasants. They maintained local 
influence and held military power, thus achieving some autonomy from the state. This autonomy 
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allowed them to either be an obstacle or an agent of state penetration, depending on what might 
benefit them the most.41 It was under this separation from the state authorities and dealing with 
self-serving rural leaders that villagers developed and retained their self-reliance and reliance on 
local actors against threats. 
 Disputes among villages were mostly resolved through negotiations between clan leaders. 
For significant crises like deadly bandit attacks, villagers could ask the county magistrate for 
military help from government provincial and county troops. However, military help was not 
provided readily or freely. Villages needed to petition the magistrate and have the money to oil 
the military machinery. More often, villagers had to be self-sufficient in solving their insecurity 
problems and fended for themselves. The following were their tactics against security threats: 
some villages formed their own militias, armed themselves with heavy weapons and artilleries, 
hired guards and watchmen, joined mutual aid associations, and allied with friendly 
neighbouring villages and clans. These defense tactics, when shrewdly managed by a local 
ambitious and charismatic individual, could make him a rural leader or even a regional 
strongman, as described in McCord’s study of Hunan military leadership.42 My interviewees, 
however, did not mention any local strongmen or prominent leaders.  
 When leadership and financial resources were available, Taishan and Kaiping villages 
relied on self-organized militias called mintuan (民團) or village corps (鄉團) for defence. These 
mintuan consisted of young village men. Smaller and weaker villages might pool their young 
men together and create a multi-village mintuan. Kaiping’s Longkou Li was an overseas village 
that banded together with eight to ten neighbouring villages to form a mintuan. Each village 
either pitched in money to hire men or volunteered its young male villagers to the mintuan.43 
They were trained by hired masters in guns and martial arts. The training usually took place 
during downtime from agricultural work around the lunar New Year.44 It is unclear when the 
village alliances were formed but similar villages’ local militarization existed as a defence 
against various security threats like rebellions and the British armed forces since the late Qing, as 
 
41 McCord, Military Force and Elite Power, 102. 
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43 Interview. Wong XY, July 30, 2019. 
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discussed by Philip Kuhn. Kuhn further explained that village alliances were based on personal 
acquaintance and a history of customary cooperation among the village elites.45 Alliances of 
course existed so long as benefits outweighed the disadvantages. Long historic rival lineages 
such as the Kwans and Setos in Kaiping allied for mutual interests from 1854 to 1867 during the 
Hakka-Punti War and Red Turban Rebellion.46  
 Villages were equipped with machine guns, rifles and handguns, as well as such 
traditional weapons as six feet long poles and big knives. Before the war, some mintuan were so 
heavily armed that they seemed to be going into battles against armies. It was understandable 
because many bandits were decommissioned or deserted army corps.47 In the 1920s, some 
mintuan even had powerful weapons including modern cannons, machine guns, steamboats, and 
searchlights to guard against bandits.48 By the time the Resistance War began in the late 1930s 
and 1940s, resources were so stretched that most of the villages’ weapons were outdated, in 
disrepair, or sold off.49 During the war, Fong C’s family pawned off their revolver to buy food. 
As a child, Ng S used to peek at her family’s rusted revolvers stored in empty ceramic rice pots. 
However, some families kept their firearms. Fong C saw his neighbour carrying a machine gun 
while fleeing the raiding Japanese troops. During village raids, the Japanese troops were only 
interested in raiding food; they ignored villagers’ weapons. The Japanese weapons were so much 
more advanced than the villagers’ antiquated and rusted weapons that they were not worth the 
trouble. The villagers’ weapons might have been ineffective against the Japanese troops during 
the war, but villagers felt they were essential for self-defence. After the war ended in 1945 and 
overseas remittances resumed, Fong C’s family purchased a new pistol for the household for 
peace of mind. Siyi villages were well armed until after 1949 when the CCP systemically 
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confiscated all firearms from the villages.50 Laws on gun confiscation appeared in Villages Law 
and Order Regulations on August 12, 1950.51 
 In addition to mintuan, villages also hired guards or watchmen for protection. For 
instance, Qilongma village hired two watchmen to guard the village. Each was stationed at the 
entrance and exit watchtowers of the village. They lived in their respective watchtowers. 
Qilongma was a small, new village and was not involved with mintuan from other villages. Its  
watchmen only served the village and had no relationship with other mintuan. The village gave 
each watchman two to three mu of fields to grow their food as payment for their work. Mintuan 
and watchmen were more useful for guarding against crop theft and minor burglars. They were 
ineffective against large bands of bandits or Japanese troops. In violent conflicts between 
villages and bandits, mintuan only served in a supporting role as guides for the county troops. As 
the villages fled approaching raiding Japanese troops, the watchmen and mintuan fled with 
them.52 
 Overseas villages maintained connections with and sought assistance from kins and 
clansmen working abroad through mutual aid associations.53 These mutual aid associations 
included ones of common surnames or clan (宗親會), such as The Hall of Tracing One’s Origin 
(遡源堂);54 common regions (同鄉會), such as the American Kaiping Common Village 
Association (美國開平同鄉總會);55 and common region plus specialty like commerce (地方商
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會), such as the Hong Kong Hoi Ping Chamber of Commerce (香港開平商會).56 Overseas 
mutual aid associations were normally located at points of departure such as Hong Kong and 
Macau, as well as at migrants’ destinations. They served as a conduit between Chinese abroad 
and their home communities. Many emigrants joined mutual aid associations for help with 
business connections, settlement abroad,57 overseas remittances to home villages, and transport 
of the bones of deceased Chinese back to home villages. These associations played a pivotal role 
in fundraising to help home communities deal with droughts, floods, famines, bandit 
suppression, building schools, and war efforts.  
 Unlike other scholars who framed mutual aid organizations as criminal gangs or political 
secret societies with the objective of overthrowing administrations, David Ownby examined 
mutual aid associations with an emphasis on religious traditions and social context, not from a 
political or ethnic perspective. Although mutual aid associations could embrace politics and 
criminality for self-interest, that was not necessarily their main mode of operation.58  
 Allying with the right villages could be a matter of life and death. Villages could seek 
assistance from neighbouring clans to mediate intervillage conflicts. Respected village elders 
commonly mediated conflicts for neighbouring villages.59 Although feuds were prevalent 
between Siyi villages in pre-1949 times, so were cooperation and alliances. Alliances with more 
powerful villages provided protection against predation from hostile villages and against a 
common enemy like the Japanese troops. Support from and alliances with neighbouring villages 
and clans were important survival tactics for Siyi villages. 
 During the onset of the war between 1938 and 1939, the KMT and CCP coordinated to 
thwart Japanese aggression in the counties, but their effort focused on the townships and did not 
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extend to the villages. Under the KMT government’s support and the CCP’s organization, they 
created defence corps such as Taishan County Youth Resist the Japanese Vanguard Troops.60 
However, these defence corps only defended towns, not villages. My interviewees who lived in 
villages during the war never heard of any defence organizations or saw them in action. 
Although my interviewees were children during that time and might not have known about the 
defence corps, but they would have heard from the adults about resistance activities or seen the 
defence corps in action during the many Japanese raids they experienced. One interviewee 
recounted in detail the story of his village and a neighbouring village’s mintuan resisting the 
Japanese troops, but did not mention any defence corps.61  
  The consistent lack of state intervention in public security of the Siyi villages resulted in 
the villagers relying on themselves to survive threats however they could in pre-1949 times. In 
times of need or life and death situations, the villagers counted on family, neighbours, friendly 
neighbouring villages or clansmen, and mutual aid societies, not official state authorities or even 
unofficial authorities like the self-government organizations (公局). It was logical for Siyi 
villagers to invest their effort and emotion locally rather than nationally. Thus, localism was 
more important than nationalism.62 
 
Threats 
 In 1944, Chow TW was deeply distraught about his twelve-year-old neighbour. The girl’s 
impoverished family had recently sold her off, and the buyers came to collect her on that 
memorable day. She refused to leave with the strangers and clung on to the metal gate in front of  
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her. Seeing her wailing and the commotion attracted a large crowd of neighbours, the girl’s 
mother grabbed a rock off the ground and smashed it on the girl’s hands. The girl finally let go 
and was carried off by the buyers. Chow TW vividly remembered this scene for seventy-five 
years.63 Being trafficked by parents was just one of the many dangers my interviewees faced. 
They dealt with danger from Japanese troops, bandits, village feuds, food scarcity, parental 
neglect and abandonment, kidnapping, and murder. The following five chapters examine these 
threats. These security threats were not always self-contained or independent. They were 
complicated, often overlapped, and interconnected with each other. While some threats were 
external and temporary, others had been continuous since imperial times.  
 Bandits, Japanese armed forces, and violent village feuds were immediate threats the 
villagers faced between 1937 and 1949. Village feuds endangered villagers before and after the 
war. Bandits terrorized the rural grassroots before, during, and after the war. The Japanese armed 
forces were a temporary but devastating security threat to the villagers. Famine and starvation 
was not limited to a specific period of time but their conditions were exacerbated by the Japanese 
invasion and when remittances were cut off from abroad. Traditional gender roles created danger 
for children and hardship for women. This threat was not often covered in government produced 
literature but was impactful to overseas households who were composed of mainly women and 
children. Examining the threats’ relationship with the local region, their consequences, and how 
villagers dealt with them allow us to understand the villagers’ priorities. Their experiences 
explain how they made sense of what was happening and how they came to choose the survival 
strategies that they did. Patriotism was not one of their motivations. 
 
63 Interview. Chow TW, July 31, 2019. 
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Chapter 2. Village Feuds and Rivalries 
 In pre-1949 times, intervillage competition and rivalry for land, grazing grounds and 
other resources were a security threat to Siyi villagers. Frequent conflicts between villages, 
between clans, within clans, or even between clan and government were recorded in local 
magazines like Taishan’s Sunning Magazine (新寧雜誌).64 Moreover, my interviewees revealed 
vivid accounts of their village feuds.65 In late 1920s Kaiping, a land dispute between the Fongs 
and the Kwans highlighted overlapping security threats and their complicated relationship with 
the community. This land dispute story illustrates the success of the overseas family survival 
strategy as wealth poured into the villages. Remittances triggered the creation of new villages 
and intervillage conflicts. Villagers dealt with conflicts through negotiations, bandits, mutual aid 
groups, county troops, mintuan, and watchmen. 
 By 1927, the overseas-remittance family strategy was well established and successful at 
generating wealth for home villages. Some Fongs from the Gouweiyao (狗尾搖) overseas village 
had more than enough remittances to sustain their basic living necessities and sought to build a 
newer and better village. With their money from overseas, they bought some plots of agricultural 
land from individual Kwans, members of a local powerful elite lineage that had lots of land and 
monopolized businesses in Kaiping.66 Although the Fongs had not yet acquired all the connected 
plots, twenty households proceeded to build new houses and established their new village, 
Qilongma. They hoped that the other Kwans would eventually sell them the remainder of the 
plots. 
 The establishment of Qilongma did not spur other Kwans to sell their remaining plots to 
the Fongs. Instead, the Kwans changed their minds about selling their land to the Fongs 
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altogether. A source said that some Kwans felt indignant that sale price was too low.67 My 
interviewee said the Kwans were jealous of the Fongs for discovering a lucky location for a 
village and wanted the land back to create their own village.68 A Feng Shui master surveyed the 
village location, proclaimed it auspicious, and said that it would prosper descendants.69 Folk 
beliefs such as a property’s Feng Shui had been a common reason for intervillage and interclan 
feuds since imperial times across China from Qing Taiwan to Sichuan. Court cases about 
geomancy disputes were common because Feng Shui was an integral characteristic of property 
rights, kinship strategies, legal territoriality, and community negotiation.70 As discussed in 
Weiting Guo’s research, feuding clans often desecrated opponents’ ancestral graves to steal the 
endowed blessing of the gravesites by discarding opponents’ ancestral remains and burying their 
own relative’s corpse in the site instead.71 Although gravesite destruction was illegal, local state 
officials avoided intervening in geomancy disputes and left them for community members and 
stakeholders to mediate and resolve. The Kwans likely saw the sudden erection of the Fong’s 
village as a sign of encroachment into their land and fortune, and felt threatened. The Kwans 
wanted the Fongs out of their land and created many obstacles for them. The Kwans, a more rich 
and powerful clan in Kaiping’s Tankou township, demanded a protection fee of 60,000 daiyang 
from the Fongs to ensure the safe construction of their village. The Fongs obliged. However, the 
Fongs’ situation did not improve after the construction of their houses. Some Kwans directed 
local thugs to burn down a small Kwan house, accused the Fongs of arson, and demanded 
compensation. Some Fongs avoided confrontations with the Kwans by moving back to their old 
village. Some did not dare to stay in the village in the daytime and only slept in their Qilongma 
houses at night. Eventually, the Fongs attempted to placate the Kwans by offering the Kwans 
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more money. The Fongs got the support of other prominent clans in Tankou marketplace such as 
the Chow, Li, and Tse clans in negotiation with the Kwans, but to no avail.72 Neighbouring clans 
commonly help diffuse and mediate conflicts. The Fongs tried to mitigate land disputes with the 
Kwans by allying with neighbouring clans but were not successful in this instance. 
 Shortly after the Fongs purchased the Kwans land in 1927, the Kwans’ new village 
headman, Kwan KC, had recently returned from the US. He made his fortune from owning and 
operating ranches. He spurned the sales of the Kwans’ land and spearheaded the mission to 
reclaim it from the Fongs. The Kwans began building houses too, right next to the Fongs’ houses 
in Qilongma Cun. Kwan KC also built a house there. His house, a grand diaolo, took up three 
times the space of a normal house. See Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Fongs’ Diaolo in Qilongma circa 1936. 
Kwan KC’s diaolo would be thrice its size. 
 
Conflicts escalated between the two antagonistic clans when they lived in close proximity to 
each other.  
 In June 1928, a gang of over eighty bandits attacked the Fongs in Qilongma village. They 
kidnapped over twenty villagers, killed more than ten, and burned twenty-three houses. Mintuan 
from neighbouring Lis and Tams gave chase to save the hostages but returned unsuccessful.73 
Interestingly, even though the Kwans’ houses were right next to the Fongs’, their people and 
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properties were left unscathed. Upon the bandits’ attack on the Fongs, the Kwans were openly 
gleeful. When people questioned the bandits’ precise and selective attacks on the Fongs, the 
Kwans in Qilongma village hastily packed up, burned their own houses down, and left. However, 
they did not go far. They established a village close by, three fields away from Qilongma 
village.74 
 Meanwhile, the kidnapped victims were held in mountainous “lairs” for about six months 
while the victims’ families raised ransom money from overseas relatives. These lairs were 
normal villages. Bandit villagers were hosting the hostages while their people negotiated with the 
hostages’ families. A four-year-old hostage even mingled with the bandit villagers and learned 
their work songs.75 Although some families could raise ransom money in a relatively timely 
manner of six months and secured the release of their loved ones, many families could not. One 
family paid three thousand silver dollars for the return of three loved ones. The cost of building 
an average two-storied diaolo was around two thousand daiyang.  
 While negotiating with the bandits, the victims’ families also solicited military help from 
the Jiangmen prefecture authority for a rescue mission through an overseas mutual aid 
association called Overseas Hong Kong Public Safety Association (僑港治安會).76 Overseas 
Chinese money founded this association, which specialized in providing safety and security to 
the Kaiping villagers, specifically in bandit suppression. A mutual aid association had more 
influence and financial power than individuals in persuading the prefecture government to send 
soldiers to fight the bandits. Although villagers could technically access prefecture military help 
for protection against threats, not every villager could afford it or was literate enough to write 
petitions to the county magistrate. Military protection for the villagers was not directly 
accessible. Siyi villagers who had relatives overseas relied on the collective power of mutual aid 
associations to access prefecture military help. 
 The prefecture troops, guided by local village corps or xiangtuan, stormed the lairs. The 
bandits moved the hostages to different lairs and gunfights ensued as the troops gave chase. Most 
of the victims were saved. During the gunfights, five villagers, four prefecture soldiers, and one 
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commander were killed. While two bandit leaders and eighty or so bandits were killed in the 
rescue mission, a few other leaders and bandits escaped. The prefecture troops seized two horses, 
fifty rifles, and two machine guns from the bandits. The mutual aid society paid almost fifty 
thousand daiyang for hiring the prefecture troops and compensation for the death and injury of 
soldiers. Additionally, they bought ten thousand daiyang worth of firearms for the county 
troops.77 Dealing with government troops seemed just as costly as fending off bandits, if not 
more so. 
 The bandit leaders were later caught. They revealed that the Kwans were collaborating 
with their gang to attack the Fongs in Qilongma village. In the late 1920s and early 1930s when 
bandits were rampant, it was not unusual for competing villages to work with bandits to 
eliminate their rivals. Both Bill Billingsley and He Wenping provide examples of village elites 
existing symbiotically with bandits in North and South China respectively. Many North China 
bandit chiefs mixed freely with local elites, treating them as social equals and inviting them to 
marriage feasts and other festive occasions.78 South Guangdong village elites used bandits to 
collect harvest taxes from villagers during harvesting season.79 Philip Kuhn and Elizabeth Perry 
also discuss the interchangeability between elites and bandits.80 The Kwans’ village headman, 
Kwan KC, escaped to Hong Kong but was later arrested and extradited to Jiangmen to be put on 
trial for murder and other crimes against the Fongs of Qilongma. Fong C’s grandmother was one 
of the kidnapped victims and stood in court to give her testimony. See Figure 4. Kwan KC and 
the bandit leaders were found guilty and executed by a firing squad. The Fongs were 
compensated with the Kwans’ land, leading to the completion of Qilongma village. The Kwans 
were ordered to never set foot in Qilongma village again and the Fongs had the right to kill any 
Kwan who disobeyed. The Kwans’ abandoned houses were eventually mined for their quality 
building stones and bricks, which were used to build the village wall and roads.81 The Fongs got 
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their village but at a price of about thirty clan members’ lives and 120,000 daiyang. Creating 
their village was bloody pricey. 
 The government did not intervene in the initial land dispute between the Kwans and the 
Fongs. While the Kwans allied with bandits to get rid of their rivals, the Fongs counted on 
clansmen, friendly neighbouring villages, and mutual aid societies for assistance. The 
government was able to give the Fongs justice at the end, but it was not the first point of contact. 
Villagers sought local solutions before turning to the government. 
 
 
Figure 4. Fong Family Photo circa 1933. 
From left to right: sister, mother, grandmother, Fong C, father, brother. 
 
 The animosity between the Qilongma Fongs and the nearby Kwans persisted into the 
Resistance War period and little skirmishes flared up, but nothing major occurred. In one 
instance, the Kwans’ cows ventured into Qilongma’s pastures. The Fongs’ children, protective of  
their property, threw stones at the cows to scare them away. The Kwans’ children saw the 
mistreatment of their animals and alerted adults. Incensed by a new slight on top of old grudges, 
the Kwan villagers gathered pitchforks and sickles82 and prepared to storm Qilongma. From the 
watchtower by the village entrance, the Fongs’ watchman fired off warning rifle shots and 
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seemingly woke the Kwan villagers from their rage. Startled, the Kwans dispersed. A potentially 
violent clash between the Fongs and the Kwans was averted. 
 During the Resistance War, major rivalry and conflicts between the villages seemed 
abated. Neither gazetteers nor my interviewees mentioned any big clashes. Instead, interviewees 
talked a lot about fleeing the Japanese troops and hunger. Most villagers were too busy staying 
safe and surviving food shortages to engage in intervillage feuds. 
 Although intervillage rivalries and feuds subsided during the war, they were difficult to 
forget. And they returned after the war. Dormant feuds could reawaken to become security 
threats when the opportunity arose. For example, the villagers of a southern Guangdong village, 
Chen village, held memories of a pre-1949 feud with an adjacent village well into the 1960s. The 
memory of the feud almost ignited a violent clash during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.83 
In the 1980s and even as recent as 2019, there were instances when pre-1949 feuding clans such 
as the Kwans and Fongs, or Setos and Kwans, were hesitant to have their children intermarry.84 
Despite the CCP’s drive to stamp out localism (地方主義) and promote cooperation amongst the 
masses after 1949, bad blood between villages was difficult to resolve. 85  
 In autumn 1946, the Ngs of Chengchang village in Taishan were preparing to exact 
revenge on the predatory Dongning village.86 On the eve of a seemingly imminent battle, 
villagers gathered rifles, machine guns, grenades, kerosene, and cotton quilts at the village’s 
ancestral hall. Five-year-old Ng S watched as the women in her household lit lamps and incense, 
and prayed to gods and ancestors throughout the night.  
 
83 Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village: Revolution to Globalization, 3rd. ed. 
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 Zhonggong Guangdong shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, “关于征研广东反‘地方主义’问题的情况汇报” 
(Report on research on Guangdong anti-localism issues), Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao 
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86 My interviewee said that stronger and bigger villages preyed on smaller and weaker villages for their 
location, assets, and or resources by force. I call the aggressive and weaker villages predatory and prey 
villages respectively. Predatory villages could burn the prey villages down, kill the prey villagers, or take 
over the whole prey village. Small overseas villages consisting of women, children, and the elderly would 
be likely targets of predatory villages. 
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 The reason for Chengchang village’s engagement in this battle was that Dongning village 
recently razed a small neighbouring overseas village, Hekeng. Some speculated that Dongning 
wanted the Hekeng village site. Others claimed that Dongning villagers were targeting Hekeng 
villagers’ remittances. Hekeng, a small overseas village with only about ten households and only 
inhabited by women and children because all their men had migrated overseas, was easy prey for 
Dongning. Two households survived the attack and were later adopted by Chengchang village. 
Those two households later changed their family name to become Ngs. Changing one’s family 
name is not a light decision. In other instances, keeping the tradition of carrying on the family 
name was so critical that boys were bought and sold and many families broken. As a bigger 
village with over two hundred households, Chengchang felt either compassion for the survivors87 
or threatened by an attack too close to home. For self-preservation, it decided to display its 
strength against Dongning village. There must have been some negotiations because the 
anticipated clash did not transpire. Dongning village did not take over the razed village site. 
Chengchang village’s show of force likely constrained Dongning village’s ambition and deterred 
future encroachments. 
 Before the Communists’ systematic overhauling of village structures,88 villages in 
Taishan and Kaiping solved their conflicts without too much government intervention. The war 
against Japan impacted the counties temporarily but not systematically. Therefore, when the 
pressures of war lifted, life resumed as before. The government did not maintain law and order in 
the villages. It only intervened in such “serious” matters as the conflict between the Kwans and 
the Fong. It got involved in such situations as the deaths of villagers, arson, banditry, and huge 
sums of money. Also, petitions from a wealthy mutual aid society with overseas connections and 
remittances motivated the government to act. Individual villagers with no connections or wealth 
probably could not solicit military help from the government. Military troops were like guns for 
hire. It was costly to deal with bandits and government troops alike. 
 Villages coped with conflicts by navigating the power structure in their local 
communities. The clan or villages with the most land and money had the power. Lesser clans or 
villages like the Fongs who wanted to expand had to appease the powerful Kwans, as seen in 
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their acquiescence to the Kwans’ extortion and even voluntary offers of more money later. 
Lesser clans could ally themselves with similar clans for strength in negotiations, as with the 
Fongs seeking solidarity with the neighbouring Li, Tse, and Hui clans. Lesser villages could also 
ally themselves with bigger villages for protection as in the case of Hekeng. They even changed 
their family names and got adopted by the bigger clan. For self-preservation, bigger villages 
needed to maintain their influential status among other villages by taking on the protectorate role 
of weaker ones. The show of force also deterred competitors’ from encroaching. Rivalries and 
predatory behaviours might have abated during the Resistance War, but resumed when the 
external security threat exited the community. 
 Villagers consistently counted on clansmen, friendly neighbouring villages, and overseas 
Chinese funds through mutual aid societies for assistance in mitigating immediate direct danger 
from intervillage conflicts. Only when the conflict escalated to violent feuds that involved 
arsons, deaths, bandits, and large amounts of money did the government got involved. 
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Chapter 3.  Bandits 
Bandits were a major direct security threat to Kaiping and Taishan villages before the 
Resistance War, seemingly disappeared during the war, and returned after the war. Interviewees 
lumped burglars, thieves, robbers, and bandits together as zei (賊). A robber is someone who 
unlawfully takes property from others by force or threat of force.89 A thief is a person who steals, 
especially secretly or without open force. A burglar is someone who enters a building illegally in 
order to steal. Bandits who threatened Taishan and Kaiping counties displayed all the 
characteristics of robbers, thieves, and burglars. Additionally, these rural bandits pillaged, 
kidnapped, killed, burned and razed villages in gangs numbering from a dozen to several 
hundred people. Gangs of bandits were led by chiefs who had political aspirations, although 
mostly self-serving ones. Their opportunistic nature complemented the rural power structure in 
which local elites had symbiotic relationships with bandits for mutual benefits, as seen in the 
Kwan-Fong conflict.  
 Pre-1949 gazetteers, wenshi ziliao, and my interviewees all described rampant large-scale 
bandit attacks before the war. Village attacks ranged from two to sixteen per year between 1921 
and 1930 in Kaiping.90 According to incomplete historical statistics, between 1918 to 1927, in 
Taishan County’s Haidi region, bandits robbed 105 villages and towns, burned down 1,114 
houses and 25 diaolo, kidnapped over 1,100 residents and killed countless.91 In 1926, Guangdong 
had about one hundred thousand bandits.92 To counter the bandit attacks, villagers built diaolo, 
western-influenced, fortified, multi-storied brick buildings where they could hide and guard their 
valuables. Diaolo were constructed with steel rebars and cement, doors and windows had metal 
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gates,93 and murder holes94 above the front entrance.95 Villagers grew spiky bamboo around the 
village perimeter walls. Villagers invested in boats, searchlights, and weaponry for their mintuan. 
 The large scale banditry of the 1920s or 1930s was absent during the war. Gazetteers and 
wenshi ziliao did not mention any banditry and none of my interviewees witnessed any bandit 
attacks. How was it that the bandits that terrorized the Siyi countryside before the war seemed to 
have disappeared during the Resistance War?  
 The bandits’ self-serving and opportunistic nature before the war explains their sudden 
disappearance during the Japanese invasion of the counties. Bandit collaboration with county 
officials, village elites, revolutionaries, and secret societies were well documented by such 
scholars as Billingsley, Perry, and He.96 Bandits collaborated with local elites and were a part of 
the power structure in the countryside, as shown in the case of the Fong-Kwan conflict. Bandits 
allied themselves with any powerful group for survival, social advancement, and political 
aspirations before the war; therefore, it is highly plausible that they collaborated with the new 
elites during the war, the Japanese invaders. Power contenders like the Japanese, KMT, and CCP 
viewed large groups of bandits as a cheap military reserve and as ideal army recruits.97 However, 
because the bandits were self-serving, they often switched allegiances depending on which side 
benefitted them most. The Japanese were their best option at that time. They were the dominant 
armed forces in Guangdong, aided by the province’s collaborationist government administered 
by Wang Jingwei’s wife, Chen Bijun.98 The KMT in Guangdong was subservient to the 
occupying Japanese and the CCP had little influence. Although much of Guangdong’s 
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countryside was unoccupied,99 the CCP could not establish effective guerrilla mobilization in the 
region because there was no political anarchy.100 Bandits did not disappear after the Japanese 
invaded the counties, they operated under the Japanese armed forces. Chinese collaborationist 
armed forces, also known by their pejorative label wei Rijun (偽日軍) or counterfeit Japanese 
army,101 behaved similarly to bandits. For example, collaborationist troops captured Taishan’s 
county seat of Taicheng on March 3, 1941. That day, soldiers killed 282 people, burned down 
534 shops and houses, and pillaged over 3.6 million daiyang worth of valuables.102 The following 
is an interviewee’s account of how collaborators terrorized a Taishan village, Chengchangcun. 
Lin Y remembered her old infirm neighbour who could not flee the raiding Japanese soldiers. 
The senior stayed behind as all the other villagers fled. After the troops departed and the 
villagers returned, the neighbours found her nailed to her wooden door in a crucifix pose. The 
senior revealed that she encountered the troops and a collaborator interrogated her about why she 
did not run away. She replied she was too old and wanted to watch over her home. The soldiers 
then offered to assist by nailing her to her door. The senior died from her injuries a few days 
later.103 Wei Rijun participated in atrocities similar to those of bandits of prewar periods. 
Evidence strongly suggests that bandits were wei Rijun during the war. As various scholars have 
noted, the categories of bandits and soldiers were fluid.104 Wei Rijun was no different. Local 
armed forces easily switched between categories depending on opportunities and benefits. They 
had fluid identities and allegiance. 
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 During the Resistance War, the invading Japanese soldiers and their collaborationist 
troops endangered the villagers. Contrary to gazetteers and wenshi ziliao’s depiction of locals’ 
valiant resistance, my interviewees fled the aggressors and tried to survive starvation and 
destitution. Interviewees did not mention any government intervention. 
 After the Japanese exited Taishan and Kaiping, banditry returned. The end of the war did 
not necessarily mean better lives for the villagers, there were just different sets of challenges. 
After the Japanese surrender at the end of 1945, mail services resumed between China and 
overseas. The influx of overseas money and goods into the counties changed the dynamics 
within community groups. When wealth is not distributed evenly in a community, conflict and 
crime arise between the haves and have nots. Sociologists Judith R. Blau and Peter M. Blau 
argue that economic inequalities generally increases rates of criminal violence.105 This was the 
case in Kaiping and Taishan after the war. Overseas households suddenly got relief thanks to 
remittances, but non-overseas households and other impoverished villagers did not. The have-
nots wanted access to money to alleviate their poverty, too. The most direct way was to take it 
from the haves.  
 Interviewees witnessed an increase in banditry, robberies, and burglaries. Bandits in 
groups of twenty to thirty targeted shops in markets. For example, interviewees from different 
villages and at separate occasions experienced school lockdowns because bandits were robbing 
gold shops and gunfights were unfolding outside their schools. After the commotions died down, 
they could leave their schools and they saw corpses of bandits and townpeople in the 
aftermath.106 In another example, an interviewee recalled an instance of robbers snatching gold 
jewelry from a marriage procession passing through the market place.107 Shortly after the war, a 
wealthy overseas returnee went back to Kaiping to get married. He paid the bride’s family 
handsomely. On the wedding day, the bride attached her gold jewelry to the marriage sedan 
cover to display her wealth. As the procession wound through the market place, a gang of 
robbers ripped off the sedan cover with all the gold jewelry and ran off. Siyi counties were 
notorious for hosting extravagant weddings because of their rich remittances before the war. In 
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1909, families would spend from five hundred to two thousand daiyang108 for a wedding.109 
However, this flagrant display of wealth at a time when many were still impoverished attracted a 
robbery. Bandits targeted easy prey such as market shops and people displaying wealth. They 
also targeted overseas remittances. The following story show how an interviewee helped her 
mother fight off a burglar at night when he caught wind they received a remittance earlier that 
day.  
 Wong B’s mother was closing up the home’s windows for the night when a burglar 
grabbed her arm from outside the window.110 The mother, startled but still retaining her wits, 
yelled out to her daughter to bring over a cleaver to chop off the intruder’s hand. The three 
struggled and created a lot of commotion. Their next door neighbour heard it all, fired a couple 
of shots in the sky with a pistol, and scared off the burglar. It was later discovered that during the 
day, someone was asking around if Wong B’s family received remittances. Unfortunately, Wong 
B’s relative, who was not very bright, said they received a large amount, which led the burglar to 
their home that night. In this instance, the mother, daughter, and the neighbour drove off the 
burglar. When I asked Wong B if she reported the instance to the police at the time, she 
dismissed my apparently ridiculous question and said there was no such thing as police in the 
village. Villagers looked out for themselves. Another interviewee told me that police did not 
exist in villages or even in marketplaces. Police were stationed in bigger commercial county 
towns like Chikhan. State public security institutions did not reach rural Taishan and Kaiping 
and did not impact villagers’ lives after the war.  
 The rural leaders were supposed to rule over villagers and provide them security 
protection via the public office (公局) with its militia.111 That might have been possible before 
the war; however, during the war, the Japanese army easily overpowered the local militia. Many 
rural ruling elites fled and abandoned the peasants. The ones who remained either voluntarily or 
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involuntarily collaborated with the invaders by supplying them girls for military brothels and 
young men for slave labour.112 The grassroots mistrusted the elites after the war because of the 
elites’ wartime abandonment and collaboration with the Japanese. 
 Villagers might not have turned to state officials or rural leaders to solve their security 
problems but they consistently turned to overseas Chinese. Local magazines and newspaper like 
Xinning Magazine (新寧雜誌), Taishan Magazine (台山雜誌) and Siyi Overseas Newspaper (四
邑僑報) published many articles about increased violent bandit attacks on and kidnappings of 
overseas families after the war.113 These articles, written for the purpose of asking for money 
from overseas Chinese working in the US and Canada for bandit suppression in the counties, 
appealed to the emigrants’ home village connections, often used the phrase “love and protection 
of home village.” The use of “love of country” appeared after 1946 but still was not as frequent 
as “love and protection of home village.” Instead of depending on government authorities for 
assistance in law enforcement, the families appealed to overseas Chinese to fundraise for bandit 
suppression. Funds were used to hire soldiers and purchase weaponry. Villagers sent letters, local 
newspapers, magazines, as well as official gentries and elites to lobby for money from overseas 
Chinese working in Hong Kong and abroad.114 Reliance on overseas Chinese and not on 
government authorities to deal with bandits was a continuity since imperial times. Home villages 
put more importance on their overseas clansmen than on the government. 
 Bandits shifted from a major threat before the war, to what appeared to be an abrupt 
disappearance during the war, then returned after the war. When the Japanese invaded the 
counties, bandits did not disappear. Their self-serving characteristics strongly suggest that they 
worked under the Japanese armed forces as collaborationist troops. Postwar bandits could have 
been decommissioned wei Rijun after the Japanese left the counties. Villagers rarely depended on 
the government for assistance. They relied on themselves, neighbours, clansmen, overseas 
Chinese, and mutual aid societies when dealing with bandits. Villagers turned to overseas 
Chinese, people with local roots, for help in fighting the bandits. 
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Chapter 4.  Japanese Aggression and Collaborators  
 The Japanese invaded Taishan in December 1937 and Kaiping in 1938115 and remained in 
the counties for the duration of the war. Troops were stationed in Taishan’s Shangchuan island 
and Kaiping’s countryside.116 The invading Japanese armed forces dominated resistance and 
replaced local armed groups as the main direct immediate danger for Kaiping and Taishan 
villagers for the eight years of Resistance War. Diana Lary’s talk of China’s brutal and 
humiliating defeats in the war galvanizing people’s nationalism and patriotism was not apparent 
in Siyi villages.117 Interviewees mainly described enduring destitution, surviving starvation, and 
fleeing the Japanese armed forces. Their responses also contradicted postwar CCP literature like 
gazetteers and wenshi ziliao which emphasize villagers’ resistance and heroic deeds during this 
period. Unlike Poshek Fu’s urban intellectuals who struggled between patriotism and passivity or 
collaboration for family survival, the Siyi rural grassroots did not display the same dilemma. The 
counties had some government-organized resistance groups but they were not active in the 
villages. Under the external threat of Japanese aggression and no internal government protection, 
the villagers’ responses ranged from resistance, avoidance, acquiescence, and collaboration.  
 The Japanese troops bombed, murdered, raped, maimed, burned and pillaged the 
counties.118 Japanese planes bombed Taishan almost every month between October 1937 to 
February 1943, killing civilians and destroying properties.119 Their atrocities committed in the 
counties were similar to the ones committed in Nanjing.120 Chinese collaborationist armed forces 
or wei Rijun were also involved. Villagers, young, old, male and female were at risk in the 
presence of the Japanese and collaborationist troops. Male villagers were injured or killed. 
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Gazetteers recorded that young girls from twelve to grandmothers of seventy were raped and 
killed. Mothers with babies were not spared.121 Japanese armed forces did not discriminate when 
attacking the counties’ residents.  
 After raids, people were forced to be coolies to carry loot to the troops’ destinations. After 
Taicheng fell on March 3, 1941, the Japanese troops forced over a thousand people to transport 
loot a great distance to their army boats.122 These forced porters were not limited to young fit 
people. Grandmothers were at risk too. During a raid in Qilongma village in Kaiping, two old 
grandmothers hid in the long grass by the edge of the fields. They waited for some time. Then 
one who was hard of hearing asked her companion loudly if the troops had left. Unfortunately, 
her blaring questions gave away their location and they were “recruited” to carry sacks of rice for 
the soldiers.123 After the grandmothers loaded the rice onto boats docked along the nearby river, 
they were allowed to leave. The grandmothers were forced to be coolies but they were not killed 
or maimed. Like most stories shared by other interviewees, their encounters were not usually 
gruesome or violent compared with gazetteer records or Lary’s account of the Japanese armed 
forces behaving with awful brutality.124 The grandmothers were lucky that they were not in the 
path of an atrocity-inflicting mission. The Japanese armed forces likely unleashed atrocities 
when they deemed them strategically beneficial. Extreme brutality was used initially to ensure 
acquiescence from the locals, as seen in the fall of Taicheng. The Japanese army’s brutal 
reputation preceded them and the news of their approach triggered evacuations of entire villages. 
Overseas villages consisting of mostly women, the elderly, and young children preferred evasion 
over resistance against the Japanese raiding army. 
 Fleeing the Japanese was a regular activity during the war. The Siyi locals had a specific 
term for it: zou Riben (走日本). Villagers hid in the mountains or fields at the news of their 
approach. Some villagers who had the money and connections fled further. They migrated to 
Macau or Hong Kong when the Japanese first invaded the counties in 1937. However, when 
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Hong Kong fell in 1942, many villagers rushed back to the counties.125 Some older interviewees 
had multiple zou Riben experiences. The following story illustrates how zou Riben was 
psychologically, physically, and financially exhausting. 
 Fong C and his village, Qilongma, fled the Japanese four times; however, the troops 
raided their homes only once. The villagers’ anxiety stemmed from the proximity of the Japanese 
army. A small division was stationed on Wok Lid Hill (鑊蓋山), across the river from the 
village. The villagers fled at the news that the Japanese troops were on the move. During their 
first zou Riben, Fong C and his family trekked through mountains to stay with relatives some 
distance away near Four Nine marketplace (四九墟).126 The family left their home in the 
morning and returned by nightfall. Their home was not raided this time but the experience 
disturbed the villagers nevertheless.  
 After their first zou Riben, seven-year-old Fong C and his family left Kaiping on a multi-
day boat ride to Macau and then Hong Kong to evade the Japanese in 1939. Fong C’s paternal 
grandmother stayed behind in Qilongma to watch over the family property. Deliberate and 
inadvertent separation of family members were distressing and common in my interviewees’ zou 
Riben stories. He, his mother, and two siblings left their comfortable two-storied diaolo in 
Kaiping to rent a one-bedroom apartment in Hong Kong for three years. The move was 
disruptive and financially costly. They settled in Hong Kong with the help of relatives and 
clansmen. Fong C and his family attempted a normal life. He and his siblings went to schools 
while living in Hong Kong. When Hong Kong fell in 1942, his family uprooted again and 
returned to Kaiping. They fled the Japanese two more times after their return between 1943 to 
1945. Each time was a whole village event. During the third zou Riben, Fong C and his family 
went to their relatives near Four Nine marketplace again but found the relatives’ village was 
being raided by the Japanese, too. By this time, the villagers had zou Riben fatigue. Escaping the 
Japanese seemed futile and they decided not to venture too far from their homes anymore. 
During the fourth zou Riben, the Japanese troops indeed raided Qilongma village. While troops 
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plundered their homes, villagers stayed in the nearby Tangkou marketplace and monitored the 
troops’ activity in their village. They waited until the Japanese troops’ departure before returning 
home. 
 Fong C and his village did not resist the Japanese aggressors but fled multiple times. 
Fong C’s story is not unique. All my interviewees shared similar zou Riben stories. Survival was 
the villagers’ priority, not resisting foreign invaders for the love of the country. The Government 
did not assist villagers in their times of need. Based on the government’s past non-engagement, 
the villagers would not have expected any assistance. However, the villagers relied on 
themselves and could count on their relatives and clansmen. Patriotism, nationalism, and loving 
the country was not a priority. 
 Although villagers preferred fleeing the Japanese troops, there were some instances of 
resistance. A powerful external security threat like the Japanese army could galvanize 
cooperation between villages to resist. Intervillage cooperation against the Japanese at the time 
did not arise out of nationalism but from local loyalty. CCP-produced wenshi ziliao often 
imposed nationalistic narratives on local history. For example, the popular local history of seven 
brave militiamen from different villages who perished in defence of Kaiping against the Japanese 
troops was framed with strong nationalism. “Their selfless deaths induced the county people’s 
love for their home and love for their country.”127 The villagers’ desire to love and protect their 
immediate homes is understandable, but they might not have felt the same way about their 
country. During the war years, a resist-the-Japanese song, “On the Songhua River” (松花江
上),128 was taught in elementary schools in Taishan and Kaiping. This song made quite an 
impression on some interviewees after seventy years as some of them can still sing parts of the 
chorus today! In 1939, Fong C was singing Upon the Songhua River in his grade one elementary 
school. He remembered that his teacher talked a lot about “strike down the Japanese invaders,” 
but did not mention anything about patriotism.129 School children were taught to resist and 
protect one’s home against foreign threats. Nationalist indoctrination would come later. 
 
127 Seto and Tse, “七士守南楼” (Seven martyrs guarding the southern tower), 46. 
128 On the Songhua River (松花江上) 
129 Interview. Fong C, August 15, 2020. 
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 Every interviewee shared zou Riben stories but only one had a resistance story. Chow 
TW recalled his village militia joining forces with a Wong village across the river to resist 
Japanese soldiers. Prior to the war, the Chow and Wong villages were neither friendly nor hostile 
toward each other. However, the war united them to fight against a common security threat. The 
militias set up antiquated cannons, stuffed miscellaneous items in them, and fired at the Japanese 
boats travelling down their river. The Japanese boats stopped and soldiers scampered on land to 
hide in nearby bamboo groves. Firing at the Japanese boats with no coherent follow-up moves 
was not a good idea. The unamused Japanese soldiers killed one of the militia members and 
searched for more. Their search led them into the Chows’ village, Gaoqi (高溪), where they 
pillaged. The villagers dispersed and fled as the soldiers approached. They hid in the 
mountainous graveyards that night to avoid Japanese retaliation. This incident shows that 
villagers had the urgency to defend their homes in any ways they could, but they lacked 
coordination or plans. Their effort did not receive support from any political parties or 
government authorities. Furthermore, continuing the trend of localized and self-reliant defence, 
the villages’ cooperative resistance with previously non-collaborative groups was not necessarily 
for nationalistic reasons as argued by Diana Lary, but for the basic self-preservation against a 
common external threat at a local level.  
 Besides resisting or fleeing, villagers could collaborate with the Japanese aggressors as a 
survival tactic. Collaborationist soldiers were active in raiding the villages. There were many 
instances of village braves battling collaborationist soldiers. Records show that on October 10, 
1943, about seven hundred collaborationist troops were about to raid Baishui township but were 
ambushed by its militia. A fierce battle ensued. With the reinforcement of KMT soldiers, the 
collaborationist troop was beaten and retreated. In that battle, two Japanese officers and about 
forty collaborationist soldiers were killed.130  The wei Rijun also mutilated villagers during raids. 
Japanese soldiers and collaborationist troops in groups of three to five often raped and pillaged 
the locals.131 Chinese collaborationist soldiers were just as dangerous to the Siyi villagers as the 
Japanese soldiers.  
 
130 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 223–224. 
131 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 225. 
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 Official records show many collaboration activities in the counties; however, my 
interviewees did not offer any information about their families or their neighbours’ involvement 
with the Japanese occupiers. Admittedly, Japanese armed forces mostly occupied major urban 
centres and railway lines;132 therefore, urbanites had more opportunities for intimate and blatant 
collaboration with the occupiers compared with rural grassroots. Nevertheless, there must have 
been different degrees of collaboration because the counties’ citizens lived through over eight 
years of Japanese occupation and under the Chen Bijun collaborator government.133 
Collaboration could range from passive adherence to the occupiers’ rules to outright working for 
them to oppress the local population. Obvious wartime collaborationists or traitors were hunted 
down then jailed or executed postwar.134 Those labeled as traitors and collaborators were scorned 
in the postwar nationalistic narrative by both KMT and CCP. As Dongyoung Hwang puts it, 
“Punishing the collaborators was a necessary step to re-establish national discipline and dignity, 
and finally to build a new nation.”135 My interviewees who lived through both administrations, 
understandably would not have admitted it even if they or their kin had collaborated. Most of 
their experiences demonstrated passive adherence to the Japanese occupation. They did not view 
their actions as collaboration. 
 The Japanese armed forces strategically used local collaborationist troops (偽日軍), and  
a collaborationist government (偽政府) to maintain local control. However, collaborators were 
not always loyal. On April 16, 1942, collaborationist troops stationed in Shangchuan, Taishan 
staged a coup and overtook the Japanese command headquarters. The mutinied collaborationist 
troops surrendered to the resistance side with their weapons and were welcomed.136 There was no 
official explanation why the collaborators switched sides. Certainly, the collaborators did not 
show any nationalism when they helped the invading Japanese and committed atrocities against 
the locals. Their non-committal nature suggested self-serving reasons. Collaborators’ actions 
resembled those of opportunistic bandits of the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
132 Lary, Chinese People at War, 46. 
133 Yick, “Self-Serving Collaboration,” 217. 
134 Dongyoun Hwang, “Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the 
Chinese Collaborators,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no. 1 (2005). 
135 Hwang, “Wartime Collaboration in Question,” 75. 
136 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 13. 
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 Wenshi ziliao war stories were collected from victors and victims of the war and framed 
with a nationalistic narrative. In these stories, collaborators were viewed as one-dimensional evil 
traitors committing crimes against the counties’ people, homes and the country. They were not 
viewed as a part of the citizenry who were surviving the war. Collaborators ended up on the 
losing side of the war. If the Japanese had won the war, they would be presented in a different 
way.  
 CCP-affiliated literature may emphasize villagers’ valiant nationalistic effort in resisting 
the Japanese armed forces; however, the villagers’ responses did not fit neatly into this 
nationalistic framework. Although there was some resistance, most villagers fled and some likely 
collaborated. The villagers’ priority was to survive during the war. 
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Chapter 5.  Famine and Starvation 
 Surviving starvation was another priority for villagers during the war. County residents 
faced massive food shortages in the counties at this time. Their coping strategies did not involve 
government interventions. The shortage was caused by drought, constant Japanese food 
requisition, as well as a trade and mail blockade. Wealthy and poor families had different 
survival tactics. To cope with food scarcity, interviewees revealed survival tactics like selling 
their valuables, reducing the number of mouths to feed in the household by sending away 
servants, abandoning or selling children, theft, and perhaps even cannibalism.  
 Interviewees talked of many county residents who starved to death because of the Japanese 
invasion.137 In 1938, Taishan had a population of 885,300. In 1943, the famine killed or drove 
out 150,000 or one-fifth of Taishan's population.138 Villagers’ food supplies were significantly 
reduced by the Japanese troops’ regular plundering. Japanese forces demanded daily rice and 
weekly livestock submissions from townships near their command stations like the county 
capital Taicheng. When nearby food resources were depleted, they raided more villages in 
groups of forty to sixty. The Japanese troops pillaged food like rice, chickens, pigs and 
valuables.139 Interviewees fled their homes at the news of approaching raiding troops and upon 
their return, they reported missing food and valuable items, destroyed front doors and 
properties.140 Food imports and overseas remittances were blocked during the Resistance War. 
Overseas families who relied on remittances to buy food had neither to sustain themselves. Many 
overseas villagers had little to no food reserves due to their habit of buying food and not growing 
it. The sudden influx of returning residents from Hong Kong after it fell to the Japanese in 1942 
and the subsequent massive drought in 1943 exacerbated the famine. After Hong Kong fell to 
Japan in 1942, over ten thousand former residents rushed back to Kaiping, straining the already 
food-scarce county. The drought in 1943 pushed Kaiping to purchase grains from neighbouring 
 
137 Seto Xing, 开平县志 (Kaiping gazetteer). 
138 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 129. 
139 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 13. 
140 Interviews. Fong C, August 15, 2019. Chow TW, July 31, 2019. 
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counties and set up congee stations to relieve the famine in townships.141 However, these congee 
stations did not seem to have benefited villages. My interviewees, who were children at the time, 
never heard of them. Instead they remembered picking herbs like Large Chipped Bowl (硼大碗) 
and Old River Roots (老江根) off hillsides and field edges to supplement their meals.142 Villages 
were left to fend for themselves. 
 Wealthier overseas families sold anything of value for food. Fong C recalled his mother 
selling her fancy clothes and eventually their family firearms to buy food. Finally, they sent their 
chattel maidservant back home to reduce the number of hungry people in the household. 
Wealthier families did not abandon or sell their children in times of food scarcity. 
 Poorer families who did not have many valuables to begin with resorted to theft, 
abandoning or selling their children. Food scarcity led to impoverished conditions which brought 
out many social problems that threatened the safety and security of the poor and the young. For 
instance, watchmen were hired to protect the villages and guard against crop theft, but they were 
not necessarily reliable performing their duties. In wartime when food was scarce, they could 
become crop thieves themselves.  
 One of the Qilongma village watchmen, Fong ZL, was young and his wife lived with him 
in the watchtower. They were originally from a nearby Fong village in the region. As the saying 
goes, people sharing the same last name are three parts related (同姓三分親). His shared last 
name with Qilongma villagers offered a bond of trust and kinship. This helped get him hired. His 
two to three mu of field did not produce enough food for him and his family.  Fong ZL and his 
wife made what must have been the difficult decision to abandon their nursing infant. They left 
the baby at a fork road leading to the Tangkou market one morning. In the afternoon, the baby 
was gone. No one in the village knew what happened to the baby but everyone knew of the 
incident. To make ends meet, Fong ZL resorted to stealing the villagers’ crops. One night, he 
was caught stealing a villager’s yams in the field. He was quickly dismissed from the watchman 
post and returned to his old village with his wife. 
 The young watchman’s story illustrates how food scarcity deteriorated public security 
and the sense of security even within one’s family. A guard who was supposed to guard against 
 
141 Seto Xing, 开平县志 (Kaiping gazetteer). 
142 Interviews. Wong XY, July 30, 2019; Wong BX, August 9, 2019; Wong LS, August 9, 2019. 
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theft became a thief. A child who was supposed to be protected and nurtured by his or her 
parents was abandoned.  As well, the story shows how poor people coped with food scarcity. The 
coping options of thievery and child abandonment were not uncommon. Many poor villagers 
abandoned or sold their children or risked starvation. My interviewees witnessed many 
abandoned children in temples and along market streets during the war. In February 1945, 
Taishan’s Siyi International Relief Association (四邑國際救濟會) took in numerous begging 
children in the counties.143 Orphaned begging children were not all caused by parental 
abandonment, they were also orphaned because their parents perished during the war. Overseas 
Chinese from the Americas actively funded and established relief associations, sometimes with 
provincial authorities, to assist suffering Siyi villagers during the war. However, relief funds 
raised by overseas Chinese did not always reach their intended audience and were lost during 
transfers between government departments.144 While overseas Chinese tried to help their home 
villages, corrupt or incompetent government authorities were an obstacle to the villagers in need 
of receiving aid. To the Taishan and Kaiping villagers, kin and clansmen were reliable and the 
government was not. 
 People heard of cannibalism during famines and extreme food shortages, but no 
interviewees admitted to participating in it. With the ongoing war, the occasional droughts, and 
subsequent famine, cannibalism stories were not uncommon according to interviewees. Although 
many interviewees claimed to have heard of cannibalism stories, they never admitted to eating 
any human flesh. As children, they may not have realized what type of meat they ate if their 
parents or adult caregivers never told them. Chow TW of Gaoqi village, Kaiping recounted a 
familiar childhood story. One day a husband brought home some supposed “dog” meat. The wife 
cooked it. As they ate, she commented on how good it tasted. He said, “Of course it is delicious, 
it was a rice eater.” A rice eater implied a person. It was unclear who these rice eaters were, but 
one can assume they could be corpses or easy prey like children.  
 While living in Japanese occupied Hong Kong and under food shortage, Seto H's mother 
warned him not to play on the streets because little children would be killed in back alleys, and 
 
143 Huang and Li, 台山县志 (Taishan gazetteer), 13. 
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their meat would be harvested and sold for food. Although this story took place in Hong Kong, a 
city far from Siyi, children were known to disappear in Kaiping and Taishan markets. Villagers 
assumed they were kidnapped. No one knew where the children went. They could be sold into 
servitude, brothels, begging troupes, or performance troupes.145 Or they might have been sold as 
food in times of extreme food shortage. Cannibalistic stories served as cautionary tales to keep 
children safe. Their circulation reflected the population’s general fear for the children’s safety at 
this time. 
 Famine and starvation devastated the rural population during the war. People’s 
desperation reduced them to abandoning their children and stealing or killing for food. The 
Resistance War’s mail and trade blockade isolated the villagers. The connection to their usual 
provider and protector, their kin and clansmen abroad, was shut down. The consequences of this 
disruption drove the villagers to desperate survival tactics. Food was the major concern for the 
rural population. Resistance and patriotism during wartime were not applicable to the Taishan 
and Kaiping rural population when they were starving. 
  
 
145 Joanna S. Ransmeier, Sold People: Traffickers and Family Life in North China (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), 141–44. 
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Chapter 6.  Traditional Gender Roles 
 In 1949, nine-year-old Ng S was left behind alone in her village home while her pregnant 
mother went to Guangzhou City to give birth to her fourth child and to live with Ng S’s father. 
Ng S was abandoned because a fortune teller claimed her birthdate overpowered her brothers’ 
survivability. Having lost two sons already, the mother distanced herself from Ng S as her fourth 
child’s due date approached. She moved 133 kilometres away to Guangzhou until Ng S married 
and left the village house, some ten years later. The tradition of the sons carrying on the family 
name generated far-reaching consequences such as kin rivalries that tormented adults, especially 
the women, and endangered boys and girls.  
 Threats posed by traditional gender roles were important in overseas villages composed of 
mainly women and children. Boys were more valued because they could carry on the surnames 
of any family, including families into which they were not born. Girls, on the other hand, were 
more dispensable and played supporting roles to the males in their families. Danger within the 
home caused by this tradition between 1937 and 1949 did not fit neatly into the government’s 
nationalistic narrative and therefore did not get coverage from official documents like gazetteers 
and were not mentioned in wenshi ziliao. The tradition of boys carrying on the family name, 
gender, and the family's wealth level created different vulnerability for children before during 
prewar, wartime, and postwar. Children could be abandoned, sold, or killed for various reasons.  
 In Kaiping and Taishan counties, sold boys commanded higher prices than sold girls 
because boys had the monumental role of propagating the lineage whereas girls were typically 
sold into servitude or prostitution for their lesser-valued labour.146 Fong C’s male cousin, Fong 
Y, was purchased into the Fong family as a boy and subsequently established a big family. Fong 
Y's branch of the family enjoyed the same remittance benefits and privileges as any biological 
Fong son. Wealthy families without any male heirs often bought boys to be their sons to carry on 
their family names, thus establishing the families’ places in the ancestral hall. Buying boys was 
common in overseas villages where productive men were abroad and not available to make 
babies. Families with sons could light their family lamps in the ancestral hall every first and 
fifteenth of the month and received ritual pork during the Spring and Autumn Rites and other 
 
146 Including child brides. Ransmeier, Sold People, 139, 253. 
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festivities.147 Families with more sons received more pork. This rule also applied to inheritances 
and remittances. Families with no sons, especially the wives, were stigmatized and often felt 
pressured to produce male heirs. Sons equaled social acceptance and status. The social pressure 
of birthing a son, especially when the husband was around to procreate, and ensuring the son’s 
survivability drove Ng S’s mother to abandon her at the age of nine.148  
 Ng S had an older and a younger brother but they all died when she was six years old in 
1947. Her firstborn older brother died in 1936 when he was only one month old. He was the 
unfortunate target of sibling rivalry between her father and his older brother. Sibling rivalries 
amongst brothers can become deadly in wealthy households when adult brothers compete over 
family assets like land, houses, servants and remittances. On her older brother’s one month 
celebration,149 Ng S’s uncle, Ng YB, under the pretence of enhancing the celebratory mood, fired 
a revolver toward the sky while standing near the baby. The tremendous noise shocked and killed 
the baby. Ng S’s mother was devastated but she had no recourse against the uncle. Ng YB was 
not only a bully in the family but also a bully in the village. Because Ng YB was the older son, 
he controlled much of the family assets, seized all the fertile fields, servants, and nice houses, 
leaving the less desirable ones to his younger brother, Ng S’s father. When Ng S’s mother first 
married into the household, Ng YB demonstrated his higher rank by slapping her in the face in 
public. He could humiliate his younger brother's wife just because he was the older brother. With 
his wealth, Ng YB manipulated the village bidding process to monopolize the right to raise fish 
in the village pond. He had a lecherous reputation and new brides to the village complained 
about his voyeurism at the outhouses. The villagers feared and hated Ng YB but were not able to 
even the score until the Land Reform of 1952 when they took his land and broke his legs. Like 
intervillage feuds that did not dissipate with time, oppression from the village bully was not 
easily forgotten. The tradition of sons continuing the lineage also did not easily disappear from 
the villagers’ collective consciousness. The Resistance War was only a distraction. Unless there 
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was a fundamental eradication of a tradition either through people’s conscious abandonment or 
state sponsorship with the people’s buy-in, the old ways resumed after the distraction passed.  
 After the Resistance War, the traditional importance placed on sons prevailed. Daughters 
continued being relegated to supporting roles. Sons were nurtured at a cost to the daughters’ 
well-being. In 1946, Ng S stopped her first-grade schooling because her younger brother was 
born and she had to stay home to care for him. However, the younger brother died of a childhood 
disease a year later. Ng S’s mother was again devastated. Since the sons’ death, the mother’s 
sadness was often exacerbated after attending ancestral hall festivities and rituals. Her mother’s 
quest to ensure that the next son would survive drove her to have Ng S’s fortune examined by a 
fortuneteller. The fortuneteller revealed that Ng S’s birthdate was incompatible with any of her 
brothers, and her mere existence would harm future ones. She had a touding jiao cai (頭頂腳踩) 
birthdate against her brothers. Touding jiao cai means that she would push against brothers who 
preceded her and would stomp on the ones who followed. After learning this revelation and 
fearful of losing another possible son, the mother avoided Ng S like the plague while pregnant 
with her fourth child. She left Ng S alone in the village home at the age of nine while she moved 
to the city of Guangzhou with her husband. She delivered a baby girl in the city. It was another 
five years before she finally birthed a son. Ng S’s younger siblings had their parents’ care and 
attention while she remained alone in the village. Ng S especially missed her mother when she 
was ill and scared of the dark when her devious neighbour frightened her with ghost stories 
living in her house. The neighbour sold the house to Ng S’s mother to pay for a gambling debt 
and wanted to reclaim it ever since. The mother visited Ng S occasionally over the years in the 
village. Ng S learned to fend for herself at a young age but showed apparent negative effects of 
childhood abandonment like depression, anxiety, lack of trust in others, and a strong need for 
self-validation. She never forgave her mother and had a very cold relationship with her. 
 Ng S’s mother was not an uncaring parent. The mother carried the then three-year-old Ng 
S on her back as they fled invading Japanese troops in 1944. Ng S was not one of the numerous 
abandoned children during the war. She was cared for by her mother at that time. Unlike poor 
families, Ng S’s wealthy family abandoned her not out of destitution but for social reasons and 
based on folk beliefs. Ng S’s mother was a victim of the social pressure of the time; however, her 
actions to pursue conformity victimized her daughter. Ng S’s mother might have believed the 
only way to ensure her son’s viability was to avoid Ng S; however, it was at the cost of her eldest 
 49 
daughter’s emotional and mental well-being. Furthermore, from the mother’s perspective, Ng S 
was left behind to guard the village family home, a traditional role for women in overseas 
villages. Women were to stay behind in the village to guard over the family assets while men 
inherited the family property and propagated the family names. From Ng S’s perspective, she 
was abandoned at an especially young age. Ng S’s story demonstrates that family dynamics in 
wealthy households were fraught with sibling hierarchy, rivalries, and traditionally designated 
gender roles.  
 Women could be victims under the oppressive social construct of gender roles, but some 
demonstrated agency and leadership within their constrained roles. Ng S’s mother was a victim 
of her social expectations, but she was also a shrewd resource manager. With the remittances, 
she hired labourers to farm the family land, invested in houses and land, and maintained food in 
the household even at times of famine. Ng S never experienced hunger in her childhood.150 
Historians and interviewees reported left-behind wives in Kaiping as de facto heads of their 
households.151 Left-behind wives were not passive and dependent on their husbands abroad. In 
addition to managing family resources, they also pursued personal welfare as seen in adultery 
cases described in Shelly Chan’s research.152  
 Boys and girls in poor families faced different security risks from those of wealthier 
families. Their well-being depended on how their mothers navigated their social environment. A 
wealthy mother’s survival tactics differed from those of a poor mother. While Ng S’s mother 
chose to abandon her because of social pressure and folk beliefs, Wong LS’s mother chose to sell 
a son after careful calculation to benefit the whole family. The Wong family got more money 
selling the son instead of the daughter, which allowed them to survive destitution. Another 
plausible motivation for the mother to sell a son was that the family already had two other sons 
to carry on the Wongs family name. With three sons and only one daughter, perhaps she could 
part with a boy. The mother’s decision to sell the younger son was calculated and not only 
caused by poverty. According to police reports, court filings, and gazetteer accounts, the 
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commonly-cited justification of crimes was a lack of choices due to destitution.153 However, 
Wong LS’s mother demonstrated that poor families had options within the limitations of poverty. 
She weighed her children’s best possible well-being as well as maximizing the value of the 
transaction for the family. Compared with abandoning a child, selling a child could be a 
calculated strategy that benefited the whole family, including the sold child. Wong LS was 
grateful for her mother’s decision not to sell her and developed a strong bond with her mother. 
Amazingly, the Wong family kept in contact with the younger brother all along. Today, Wong 
LS lives in Vancouver and her younger brother lives in Toronto. But, Ng S did not forgive her 
mother, even after the mother's death. 
 The desperation of Ng S’s mother to acquire a son was shared by other overseas village 
women as well. Overseas village women often could not have children because their absent 
husbands were working overseas and sometimes never returned. Overseas village women often 
bought sons from poorer families to carry on the family names. After the war, when travel 
restrictions ended and remittances resumed in the counties, many overseas village women had 
passed their childbearing age. With their disposable income, the women must have had a 
shopping spree. An interviewee recalled suddenly having many newly purchased boys as 
neighbours in his village.  
 Chow TW lived in Gaoqi, an overseas village with most men working overseas and 
sending money to their families. His father went abroad before he was born, so he had never met 
him. Shortly after the war in 1946, the thirteen-year-old Chow TW noticed many of his 
neighbours had newly purchased sons. Because he had never met his father, he asked his mother 
if he was also purchased. His aunt quickly rectified his unfilial thoughts with a thorough scolding 
and pointed out his carbon copy likeness to his mother. Chow TW was one of the lucky children 
who was not sold, abandoned, neglected, starved to death, or eaten during the war. 
 Compared to adults, many village children of rich and poor families during the war and 
postwar lived precarious lives. Children did not have any agency in dealing with security threats 
in their environment. Girls were not as valued and were subjected to abandonment or neglect. 
Boys may have been valued but their safety was not guaranteed. Ng S’s older brother was an 
example of how boys were seen as threats in sibling rivalry within wealthy families and targeted 
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for elimination. Sold girls had tougher lives as servants or prostitutes. Sold boys in Siyi villages 
lived better lives. The same fate could not be said for boys trafficked to the cities.154 The 
combinations of the tradition of sons carrying on the family name, the absence of males created 
by overseas households’ survival strategy, and the effect of the Resistance War sustained the 
trafficking of boys in the Siyi villages. Adults had control over their security. Children did not. 
Boys and girls faced different security threats but boys generally had easier lives than girls. 
 The government did not interfere with village affairs too much, let alone with family 
issues such as traditional gender roles. On the other hand, the absence of men and the overseas 
remittances directly affected Siyi villagers’ family composition. Traditional gender roles and 
how villagers coped with the consequences of this tradition shows that overseas connections 
were more impactful than the government and country. 
 
154 In 1910s Beijing, boys were trafficked into opera or beggar troupes. When the children did not collect 
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Taishan and Kaiping villagers displayed strong localism and not nationalism between 1937 and 
1949. Their reliance on and connections with local actors were evident through their survival 
tactics in the face of various security threats during the prewar, wartime, and postwar periods. 
 In spite of the May Fourth movement in 1919 when intellectuals and revolutionaries 
advocated nationalism, the concept of loving China as a country was not yet widely apparent in 
the southern Guangdong countryside in the 1940s. Rural Guangdong did not have a history of 
attachment to the central government. The central administration did not engage with rural 
Guangdong and had relied on local elites to govern since imperial times. Although Chen Bijun 
established a collaborationist government in Guangzhou during the Resistance War, the Japanese 
did not fully control rural Guangdong, either.155 During the Resistance War and the subsequent 
Civil War between the CCP and KMT between 1937 and 1949, the rural Guangdong population 
did not have strong ties to the country but valued local alliances. Faced with conflicts and 
security threats, villages did not engage too much with government authorities but relied on local 
connections for assistance. Particularly, villagers relied on overseas Chinese and their 
remittances for help in many ways. Overseas Chinese were important to Siyi villagers because of 
their financial support for social and economic development as well as assisting them in 
mitigating threats. The mail blockade during the war really devastated the counties because 
remittances had been their source of livelihood and protection. Overseas Chinese had local roots, 
were so connected to, and so actively participated in local issues that they should be considered 
local actors. Villagers’ connections with local actors like neighbours, clansmen, allied villages, 
and overseas Chinese were stronger than their ties to the government and nation. The  
government organized resistance and hunger relief programs in county capitals and larger towns, 
but they did not reach the rural countryside to affect villagers’ lives. The villagers’ sense of 
localism was potent before 1949 and endured through various political movements after 1949. 
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Even as recently as 2019, interviewees retained memories of pre-1949 feuds and displayed 
hesitancy about intermarriages between previously feuding clans. 
 The CCP selected stories that fit its nationalistic narrative, or imposed its nationalistic 
narrative onto historical events or people. For example, wenshi ziliao highlighted patriots who 
helped in the war effort and committed to rebuilding the postwar country. These people were 
often overseas merchants who might have some patriotism. However, patriotism may not have 
been their only motivation. Glen Peterson showed how overseas Chinese merchants’ embrace of 
the nationalist discourse was a strategy to pursue profit in their native villages at the turn of the 
twentieth century.156 They also provided public works, disaster relief, and support for local 
education to exert political influence and establish control over public resources in native 
villages. Overseas merchants had strong motivations to claim patriotism. The grassroots rural 
population did not. Interviewees revealed that resisting the Japanese troops was not their priority 
during the war. Their priorities were to escape the Japanese troops and to survive food scarcity 
and danger posed by traditions during that time. According to the postwar nationalistic 
framework about the Resistance War, resisting was the ultimate patriotism and collaborating was 
the ultimate betrayal.157 Because the villagers hardly resisted and mainly fled the invaders, they 
cannot be considered patriotic or nationalistic. However, the moral distinction of collaboration 
and resistance is an ahistorical concept that should not apply to rural Siyi villagers or anyone at 




156 Peterson, “Overseas Chinese and Merchant Philanthropy in China,” 104. 
157 Brook, Collaboration. 
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Appendix. Illustrated Short Story 
 
The following short story illustrates the choices made by people of different 













1 Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–
1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 126. 
 
2 1 tam = 1331⁄3 lb. 
 
3 Interview. Wong LS, August 9, 2019, March 15, 2020. Wong LS was the nine-year-old mei mei in 1942. 
 
4 1 Minguo silver dollar bought 1 tam of grain at the end of the Republican era. Purchasing power of a 
daiyang in the 1940s. 
 
